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Graph-Based Approaches to Structural
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Abstract. Structural universals have been introduced in the philosophical literature
on examples such as chemical molecules composed of bonded atoms of different
kinds. They are useful to handle complex abstract entities such as designs of arte-
facts, shapes, strings, words and texts, relevant in many areas of applied ontology.
We use graph-theory as a unifying framework to review and compare the formal ac-
counts proposed by Armstrong, Bennett and Mormann. We then propose a more ex-
pressive account, combining features of Bennett’s and Mormann’s proposals, able
to model both the mereology of complex states of affairs and the structure of the
particulars involved in them. Structural universals are explicitly represented; their
structure, where a same universal can be part of a structural universal several times
over, can be read off the graphs representing complex states of affairs.
Keywords. structural universal, state of affairs, mereology, graph theory
1. Introduction
Structural universals have been discussed by philosophers at least since the debate be-
tween Armstrong, Forrest and Lewis on the Australasian Journal of Philosophy (vol. 64)
in 1986. Their very existence was contested by Lewis who defended the use of complex
states of affairs instead, on the basis of mereological arguments. This debate is reflected
today with two main proposals: Bennett’s, who develops a formal account of structural
universals and their parts [1], and Mormann’s, who argues with Lewis in favour of com-
plex states of affairs [2]. Structural universals are properties whose instances are partic-
ulars presenting a complex mereological structure. A key to the debate is whether that
mereological structure can be described among universals or among the corresponding
states of affairs. To take the classical example of chemical molecules such as methane
CH4, can one characterize the universal being methane in terms of the universals being
carbon and being hydrogen? If so, how to account for the difference between methane
CH4 and methylene CH2? Can being hydrogen be part of being methane four times over
and of being methylene twice over? How to account for the difference between butane
and isobutane molecules, both having the same number of carbon and hydrogen atoms
(and the same number of bonding links)?
We hold that this debate on the duality between structural universals and complex
states of affairs is relevant to applied ontology. When abstract entities such as kinds,
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species, designs, shapes, strings, words, or texts, that all can have multiple realizations,
are in the domain of discourse, their structure becomes at stake. How do we represent
that a car model has four times a certain kind of wheel? How can a sentence contain
several times the same word?
In this paper, we review part of the formal solutions offered in the recent philosoph-
ical literature, taking graphs as a unifying framework. We start by giving elements of
graph theory and mereology in the next two sections. Bennett’s and Mormann’s propos-
als are then analyzed in Sect. 4 and 5. We show that these solutions have limitations and
then propose in Sect. 6 a way of combining and extending them so as to overcome these
issues, illustrating our proposal on a few prototypical cases.
2. Graphs
A graph is pair G = 〈V,E〉 where V is a non-empty set of vertices or nodes, and E is a
(possibly empty) set of non-ordered pairs of vertices in V , i.e., a set of edges or arcs. In a
direct graph (digraph) the edges are oriented, they are ordered pairs of vertices. We de-
note the set of vertices (edges) of a graph G by VG (EG). The subgraph and induced sub-
graph relations ⊆G and ⊑G are defined in (d1) and (d2), while (d3) introduces a structural
isomorphism between graphs that abstracts from specific vertices and edges.
d1 G ⊆G H iff VG ⊆ VH and EG ⊆ EH
d2 G ⊑G H iff VG ⊆ VH and EG = EH/VG (where / is the restriction operator)
d3 G ≡G H iff there is a bijection φ : VG → VH s.t. (u,v) ∈ EG iff (φ(u),φ(v)) ∈ EH
A labeled (di)graph is 4-tuple G = 〈V,E,L,λ〉 where V is a non-empty set of nodes,
E is a set of directed edges (ordered pairs of nodes), L is a set of labels and λ : V → L is
a total function (different nodes can share labels). We write v:l to say that l is the label of
v, i.e., λ(v) = l. (d4), (d5), and (d6) extend ⊆G, ⊑G, and ≡G to the case of labelled graphs.
d4 G ⊆L H iff VG ⊆ VH , EG ⊆ EH , and λG = λH/VG, i.e., the restriction of λH to VG
d5 G ⊑L H iff VG ⊆ VH , EG = EH/VG, and λG = λH/VG.
d6 G ≡L H iff there is a bijection φ : VG → VH such that
(i) (u,v) ∈ EG iff (φ(u),φ(v)) ∈ EH and (ii) λG(v) = λH(φ(v)).
A multidigraph is a tuple G = 〈V,E, τ,η〉 where V is a non-empty set of vertices, E is
a set of edges, and τ and η are two functions from E to V such that τ determines the tail
of an edge (the initial vertex) while η its head (the final vertex), e.g., for an edge e from
v1 to v2, τ(e) = v1 and η(e) = v2. It is then possible to have different edges with the same
tail and head. A path in a multidigraph G is a sequence 〈e1, . . . ,en〉 of nodes in EG such
that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, η(ei) = τ(ei+1).
3. Mereology
Parthood is probably the best studied formal relation in ontology. Depending on the
domain of application and on the underlying motivations, some properties of parthood
are considered as too strong, and then ruled out, or as evident and then accepted without
hesitation. For instance, transitivity (a3) and extensionality (a7), i.e., that two entities
with the same parts must be identical, have been extensively discussed (see, e.g. [3,
4]). We here only consider the following definitions and axioms, assuming a first-order
language with the primitive predicate P, where P(x,y) stands for “x is part of y”.
d7 PP(x,y) , P(x,y)∧¬x = y Proper part
d8 O(x,y) , ∃z(P(z, x)∧P(z,y)) Overlap
d9 AT(x) , ¬∃y(PP(y, x)) Atom
a1 P(x, x) Reflexivity
a2 P(x,y)∧P(y, x) → x = y Antisymmetry
a3 P(x,y)∧P(y,z) → P(x,z) Transitivity
a4 ∃y(P(y, x)∧AT(y)) Atomicity
a5 PP(x,y) →∃z(P(z,y)∧¬O(z, x)) Weak supplementation
a6 ¬P(y, x) →∃z(P(z,y)∧¬O(z, x)) Strong supplementation
a7 (∃z(PP(z, x))∧∀z(PP(z, x) → PP(z,y))) → P(x,y) Extensionality
t1 (a6) ⊢ (a5)
t2 {(a1), (a2), (a3), (a6)} ⊢ (a7)
(a1)-(a3) are usually considered as the minimal basis, the ground mereology [3], although
too weak to capture the ‘essence’ of parthood, since P simply is a classical partial or-
der relation. Simons [4] assumes that, in addition to (a1)-(a3), P must satisfy weak sup-
plementation (a5). A stronger version of this principle is often considered, see (a6) and
(t1). In the following we use these principles to understand which type of mereological
systems we are representing by means of certain relations between structured entities.2
4. Bennett and having a part twice over
To represent structural universals—e.g., being methane is a structural composition of be-
ing carbon, being hydrogen, and being bonded, or, in case of strings, being baa is a com-
position of being b, being a, and preceding—Bennett [1] develops a theory that allows an
entity to be part of another entity several times over. She claims that the being three feet
from binary relation may hold multiple times between the same entities, e.g., “consider
two antipodal points on a sphere, such that the shortest distance between them along the
surface is three feet” Bennett [1, p.83]. One can then assume that the same applies to
parthood, e.g., the parthood relation between being hydrogen and being methane holds
four times, while it holds two times between being a and being baa. Bennett’s theory is
based on the distinction between slots (roles) vs. fillers (occupiers) of slots and considers
two primitives: F(x, s) stands for “x fills s” while Ps(s, x) stands for “s is a parthood slot
of x”. These two primitives are governed by the following axioms:
a8 F(x, s) →∃y(Ps(s,y)) only slots are filled
a9 F(x, s) →¬∃y(Ps(x,y)) slots cannot fill
a10 Ps(s, x) →¬∃r(Ps(r, s)) slots don’t have slots
a11 ∃s(Ps(s, x)) →∃r(Ps(r, x)∧F(x,r)) improper parthood slots
a12 Ps(r,y)∧F(y, s)∧Ps(s, x) → Ps(r, x) slot inheritance
2We do not consider here the closure principles, i.e., rules that establish how the mereological domain can
be closed under sum, product, difference, etc.
a13 F(x, s)∧Ps(s,y)∧F(y,r)∧Ps(r, x) → x = y mutual occupancy is identity
a14 Ps(s, x) →∃!y(F(y, s)) single occupancy
a15 ∃s(Ps(s, x))∧∃s(Ps(s,y)) → (¬∃s(Ps(s, x)∧F(y, s)) →∃r(Ps(r,y)∧¬Ps(r, x)))
slot strong supplementation
(d10) defines parthood, i.e., x is part of y when x fills one slot of y while the other mere-
ological relations are defined as done in Sect. 3. An entity x is part of y twice over when
x fills two different slots of y. Bennett shows that parthood is transitive, antisymmetric,
and (conditionally) reflexive, but that it does not satisfy neither weak supplementation
nor extensionality. On the other hand, Bennett shows that both weak supplementation
and extensionality, reformulated as in (t3)-(t4), hold for parthood slots.
d10 P(x,y) , ∃z(Ps(z,y)∧F(x,z)) parthood
t3 PP(x,y) →∃z(Ps(z,y)∧¬Ps(z, x)) slot weak supplementation
t4 ∃z(PP(z, x)∨PP(z,y)) → (x = y ↔∀z(Ps(z, x) ↔ Ps(z,y))) slot extensionality
To understand how Bennett’s theory can be integrated into a graph-based framework
we show how it can be interpreted in terms of multidigraphs G = 〈V,E, τ,η〉 where (i) for
all v ∈ V there exists a e ∈ E such that τ(e) = η(e) = v (there are loops for every node);
and (ii) 〈V,E\{e | τ(e) = η(e)}, τ′,η′〉 is acyclic (τ′ and η′ are the restrictions of τ and η to
the new set of edges). Assume to have a graph G that satisfies such constraints, and an
interpretation function I from the language of Bennett’s theory into G. Our idea is that
slots are interpreted into edges, fillers into vertices, and
– F(x, s) iff τ(sI) = xI
– Ps(s, x) iff there exists a path 〈s
I ,e1, . . . ,en〉 s.t. η(en) = x
I .
We can prove that (a8)-(a15) are satisfied:
(a8) By hypothesis τ(sI) = xI . It is enough to take yI = η(sI).
(a9) By hypothesis τ(sI) = xI thus xI cannot be an edge as required by Ps(x,y).
(a10) By hypothesis there is a path 〈sI ,e1, . . . ,en〉 s.t. η(en) = x
I , so sI cannot be a vertex
as required by Ps(r, s).
(a11) By hypothesis there is a path 〈sI ,e1, . . . ,en〉 s.t. η(en) = x
I . By the hypothesis (i) on
the admitted multidigraphs there is an e ∈ E s.t. τ(e) = η(e) = xI . Consider rI = e.
(a12) By hypothesis there exist two paths: 〈rI ,e1, . . . ,em〉 such that η(em) = y
I and
〈sI ,e′
1
, . . . ,e′n〉 such that η(e
′
n)= x
I . The condition F(y, s) implies that τ(sI)= yI , thus
η(em) = τ(s
I) and consequently 〈rI ,e1,em, s
I ,e′
1
, . . . ,e′n〉 is a path where η(e
′
n) = x
I .
(a13) By hypothesis there are two paths 〈sI ,e1, . . . ,en〉 and 〈r
I ,e′
1
, . . . ,e′m〉 s.t. τ(s
I) =
η(e′m) = x
I and τ(rI) = η(en) = y
I , thus 〈sI ,e1, . . . ,en,r
I ,e′
1
, . . . ,e′m〉 is a cycle. By
the hypothesis (ii) on the acyclicity of admitted multidigraphs, the only cycles are
paths 〈e′′
1
, . . . ,e′′
i
〉 s.t. η(e′′
1
)= τ(e′′
1
)= · · ·= η(e′′
i
)= τ(e′′
i
). So xI = τ(sI)= η(en)= y
I .
(a14) It is enough to observe that τ is a function so that the tail of an edge is unique.
(a15) From the hypotheses, x , y, otherwise, by (a11), there is a slot s s.t. Ps(s, x)∧F(x, s).
Take two paths 〈e1, . . . ,en〉, 〈e
′
1
, . . . ,e′m〉 s.t. η(en) = x
I and η(e′m) = y
I . Since η is a
function from edges to nodes and xI , yI , en , e
′
m. It is enough to take r
I = e′m.
3
3According to this interpretation, different objects cannot share direct slots (slots represented by paths of
length 1), i.e., direct slots depend on the object they are slots of. Objects can share a slot only when they have
a common part filling their slots that, in its turn, has a slot. It is not clear to us if Bennett had this in mind.
G1: baa
a
OO OO
b
!!
G2: aa
a
OO OO
G3: aba
a
OO OO
b
!!
G1+3: baa aba
a
OO OO "" ""
b
## OO
G4: baa
a
2
OO
3
OO
b
1
!!
G5: aba
a
1
OO
3
OO
b
2
!!
G6: baa
a
OO OO
$$
%%
b
!!
G7: aba
a
OO OO
&&
b
!!
''
Figure 1. Alternative representations of structural universals.
An object x is part of an object y twice (or several times) over when two (or several)
edges have (the vertex representing) x as tail and (the vertex representing) y as head. For
instance, the universal being baa can be represented as G1 in Fig. 1 where there are two
different slots linking a with baa, and being aba as in G3.
4 G2 and G1+3 (baa and aba
in a single graph) in Fig. 1 show, respectively, that parthood (see (d10)) does not satisfy
weak supplementation (a5) and extensionality (a6). Furthermore, (a15) (and (t3)-(t4)) is
quite weak. For instance, the graph H : a← b satisfies Bennett’s axioms. In H not only a
has as unique proper part b but it also has only one proper (excluding the loop) slot. As
we will see, this type of graphs can be useful to represent the constitution relation.
Discussing the butane vs. isobutane example, very similar (but not identical, see
below) to the baa vs. aba example, Fisher [5] claims that in Bennett’s approach they
become identical because of the slot extensionality (t4). We do not agree on that analysis.
G1 and G3 have the same number of slots filled by the same universals, but the slots
—in this graph interpretation, the edges—are private to them, baa and aba do not share
any slot (or edge), only all their parts, as can be clearly seen on the whole graph G1+3.
However, Fisher has a point about the structural difference between the representation of
baa vs. aba in Bennett’s approach. In fact, G1 and G3 are isomorphic (G1 ≡G G3), they
differ only because of their top nodes. To obtain a representation clarifying the structural
difference between baa and aba, one possibility is to label slots (as suggested by Fisher),
where the labels represent kinds of slots, that is, different ways an entity can be involved
in the whole, as in G4 and G5 in Fig. 1.
5 This solution however leaves all the structural
information necessary to distinguish the two wholes encapsulated into edge labels. A
more interesting possibility is the preceding relation between the letters composing a
string. Edges are labelled here too, but in this case we only distinguish parthood (solid
arrows) from preceding relations (dotted arrows) rather than different kinds of parthood,
as in G6 and G7 in Fig. 1. The reason why two edges link a to baa is explicit in G6: one
edge corresponds to the a preceded by b, the other to the a preceded by a; while in G7
one edge corresponds to the a preceding b, the other to the a preceded by b.
This last solution has nevertheless some limitations. Consider, for instance, the uni-
versals u1 and u2 that have the complex structure depicted in Fig. 2. These diagrams
do not show graphs interpreting Bennett’s representations as discussed above, since the
universal a appears twice and the structural universals u1 and u2 are missing, but a visual
4We omit to represent the loops and the preceding universal (that however is considered later).
5Fisher talks about ordering or arranging slots, here we are considering different kinds of slots.
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Figure 2. Problem with some structured universals.
representation akin to standard molecule diagrams in which multiple occurrences of, say,
H appear. Clearly, u1 and u2 have non-isomorphic structures. However, when we turn
them into the graphs G8 and G9 in Fig. 2 they become isomorphic because we cannot
distinguish the cases where the top a is linked to the bottom a from the case where the
bottom a is linked to the top a. What the example shows is that, starting from the uni-
versals a and b, different wholes can satisfy the conditions that a is part of the whole
twice over while b only once, and that a! a, b! a and a! b. The difference between
G8 and G9 is then still encapsulated into their top nodes.
6 This is also what happens in
the case of butane vs. isobutane. Not only these molecules are composed by the same
number of hydrogen and carbon atoms, but the number of carbon-carbon and hydrogen-
carbon bonding links are the same, so Bennett’s proposal, even extended with bonding
universals as relations among universals, cannot account for their difference.
For a more explicit representation of the structure, while retaining Bennett’s idea of
multiple parthood relationships defined on the same universals, we build on Mormann’s
work [2] aiming at representing complex states of affairs rather than structural universals.
5. Mormann and complex states of affairs
Mormann [2] studies the mereological structure of complex states of affairs (states here-
after) by using the ‘tool’ of (labelled) graphs. In his account, possibly complex states are
represented by graphs and parthood between states by the subgraph relation ⊆G (or ⊆L).
In this way he intends to specify the mereology of states, that actually are structured enti-
ties, without committing to structural universals and structured particulars. More specif-
ically, Mormann assumes that (labelled) nodes represent thick particulars, as opposed to
thin particulars, a distinction introduced by Armstrong [7]. For Armstrong, a thin partic-
ular is a particular “in abstraction from its properties” [7, p.123] while a thick particular
is a particular “taken along with all and only the particular’s non-relational properties”
[7, p.125], i.e., the thick particular is identical with the state a’s being N, where N is
the nature of a, i.e., the conjunction of all its non-relational properties. In Mormann’s
graphs, edges represent instantiations of binary universals. Mormann too focuses on the
field of chemistry. This means that the bonding universal in molecules holds between
thick rather than thin particulars as assumed by Armstrong in [7]. Similarly, the labels of
the nodes identify kinds of thick particulars that can be taken to correspond to the uni-
versal that is the nature of the thin particulars (we write in the same way the nature of the
thin particular and the kind of the thick particular). For instance, the labelled graph M1
in Fig. 3 represents the complex state where a,b,c,d are thick particulars of kind h, i.e,
6As observed by Cotnoir [6] defining the mereological sum operator in the framework proposed by Bennett
also poses a general problem, which we ignore here.
a:h
M1: b:h e:c c:h
d:h
S 1: a:b -- b:a -- c:a S 2: d:a -- e:b -- f :a
Figure 3. A molecule of methane and two strings.
instantiations of the universal being hydrogen by different particulars, e is a thick partic-
ular of kind c that corresponds to an instantiation of being carbon, and the edges are in-
stantiations of the bonding universal holding between specific thick particulars. M1 then
represents the instantiation of being methane by the thin particulars involved in the thick
particulars represented by the nodes. Similarly, the graphs S 1 and S 2 in Fig. 3 represent,
respectively, the instantiation of being baa and being aba by the thin particulars involved
in the thick particulars of their nodes. S 1 and S 2 are not L-isomorphic (see (d6)), and,
importantly, the same would hold for instantiations of the complex universals u1 and u2
of Fig. 2. As said, Mormann refuses both structural universals and structured particulars.
For instance, M1 represents a complex state without referring to being methane or to
a thick methane-particular. The instantiation of being methane is a façon de parler to
express the complex pattern of instantiations (by several thin particulars) in M1.
To represent the mereological structure of complex states, Mormann establishes a
parallel with the mereological structure of sets. Starting from a set X, one can build the
powerset of X (the set of all the subsets of X) denoted by P(X) and P−∅(X) = P(X)\∅.
The relational structure 〈P−∅(X),⊆〉 is a classical mereological system which satisfies
(a1)-(a7), i.e., a Boolean algebra without the bottom element. In the case of states, one
can start from a graph G and consider the relational structure 〈P⊆(G),⊆L〉 where P⊆(G)
denotes the set of all the ⊆L-subgraphs of G (note that 〈∅,∅〉 is not a graph because the
set of nodes must be non-empty). Mormann shows that 〈P⊆(G),⊆L〉 (and 〈P⊆(G),⊆G〉 in
case of non-labelled graphs) is not a classical mereological system, actually he proves
(cf. [2] theorem 2.9) that, by adding 〈∅,∅〉 into P⊆(G), 〈P⊆(G),⊆L〉 is a Heyting algebra
that in general is not a Boolean algebra. In particular 〈P⊆(G),⊆L〉 satisfies reflexivity,
antisymmetry and transitivity but not weak supplementation (a5) and extensionality (a7).
For counterexamples, take G = 〈{u:a,v:b,z:c}, {(u,v), (v,z)}〉, X = 〈{u:a,v:b}, {(u,v)}〉, Y =
〈{u:a,v:b},∅〉 and Z = 〈{u:a,v:b,z:c},∅}〉. For (a5): both X and Y are in P⊆(Y), Y ⊆L X,
and X , Y; however, all graphs ⊆L-included in X, i.e., Y , 〈{u:a},∅〉, and 〈{v:b},∅〉, are also
⊆L-included in Y . For (a7): both X and Z are in P⊆(G); X has three proper subgraphs,
〈{u:a,v:b},∅〉, 〈{u:a},∅〉, and 〈{v:b},∅〉, that are also proper subgraphs of Z but X *L Z.
As noted, the graphs S 1 and S 2 in Fig. 3 are not L-isomorphic. In addition, the
mereological systems 〈P⊆(S 1),⊆L〉 and 〈P⊆(S 2),⊆L〉 contain other non-L-isomorphic
graphs, e.g., X = 〈{b:a,c:a}, {〈b,c〉}〉 ⊆L S 1 is not L-isomorphic to any subgraph of S 2 and
Y = 〈{d:a,e:b}, {〈d,e〉}〉 ⊆L S 2 is not L-isomorphic to any subgraph of S 1.
According to Mormann, by assuming binary universals to hold between thick partic-
ulars, his approach solves some problems the framework of Armstrong suffers of. Adopt-
ing Armstrong’s view, nodes would represent thin (not thick) particulars, edges binary
(bonding) relationships between thin particulars, and labels universals (and the labelling
function a sort of instantiation). Mormann claims that “for many essentially different
molecules it [Armstrong’s approach] gives the same mereological structure” [2, p.413].
In particular he refers to the case of butane and isobutane molecules but a similar problem
applies to S 1 and S 2 in Fig. 3. A sketch of Mormann’s argument follows.
Suppose to have states in the domain and to denote by {p|a} and {r|ac} the
states that correspond to ‘a’s being p’ and ‘a and c being in the relation r’. Thus,
the graphs S 1 and S 2 in Fig. 3 correspond, respectively, to the complex states
SOA1 = {b|a,a|b,a|c,prec|ab,prec|bc} and SOA2 = {a|d,b|e,a|f ,prec|de,prec|ef }. The
mereological structures 〈P−∅(SOA1),⊆〉 and 〈P
−∅(SOA2),⊆〉 are different because SOA1 ,
SOA2. Mormann argues that by assuming an equivalence relation between complex states
that just counts the number of atomic states (singletons) of the same kind (e.g., in SOA1
and SOA2 there are three kinds of states, namely, a-, b- and prec-states) then SOA1 and
SOA2 are equivalent (both have 2 a-states, 1 b-state, and 2 prec-states).
However, this is a very rough way of defining equivalence between complex states.
Armstrong’s notion of state is richer, every atomic state involves not only a universal (the
kind of the state) but also the thin particulars that instantiate such universal. In this view
it is possible to introduce a stronger notion of equivalence: states S and R are equivalent
if there is a 1-1 correspondence between the particulars involved in S and R such that
for every atomic state part of S there is an atomic state of the same kind that is included
in R and that involves the corresponding particulars and vice versa. According to this
stronger definition, SOA1 and SOA2, as well as some of their parts, are not equivalent.
The criticism of Mormann to Armstrong seems then to hold only in the case one em-
braces a very rough definition of equivalence between states. According to our view, the
structures considered by Mormann are just more restrictive than Armstrong’s. For in-
stance {b|a,a|b,bond|bc} ∈ P−∅(SOA1) but there are no subgraphs of S 1 that correspond
to this state. Vice versa, for every subgraph of S 1 it is easy to find a corresponding state
in P−∅(SOA1). For instance a:b! b:a corresponds to {b|a,a|b,prec|ab} ∈ P
−∅(SOA1). It is
because some of the states considered by Armstrong are ruled out by Mormann that the
extensionality of ⊆L (and ⊆G) is lost. Mormann’s proposal provides then a stricter char-
acterization of the notion of state of affairs. For instance, the fact that {b|a,a|b,bond|bc}
does not correspond to any graph in 〈P⊆(S 1),⊆L〉 means that, according to Mormann,
such configuration of the world is not a state of affairs. Interestingly, this way of ruling
out some of Armstrong’s states is based on the notion of graph itself, i.e., it is the as-
sumption of representing states by graphs that rules out some states accepted by Arm-
strong. This assumption has nothing to do with the mereological structure taken into ac-
count, it concerns the specific commitment about the nature of states. It seems to us that
it is also orthogonal with the choice of assuming the bonding relation as defined on thick
(rather than thin) particulars. However, we do agree with Mormann that forcing states to
include all the thick particulars whose thin particulars are involved in instances of binary
relations makes sense. This is why we adopt the approach based on labelled graphs.
Starting from Mormann’s position, one could be still more restrictive. Assume that
states are represented by graphs but consider 〈P⊑(G),⊑L〉whereP⊑(G) denotes the set of
all the ⊑L-, instead of ⊆L-, subgraphs of G, i.e., in the context of the graph G, some ⊆L-
subgraphs are ruled out to keep only induced G-subgraphs. For instance, 〈{a:b,b:a},∅}〉
belongs to P⊆(S 1) but not to P⊑(S 1), while 〈{a:b,b:a}, {〈a,b〉}〉 belongs to both. The idea
is that when in the graph G (representing a complex state) there is an edge between
two nodes (a binary relation between two thin/thick particulars), one cannot exclude
this edge in subgraphs including the two nodes. In other words, admissible substates are
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Figure 4. Three different structural universals specializing being aabb.
those portions of a state obtained by focusing on a subset of particulars, together with
all the facts internal to this subset—not only the properties of these particulars as in
Mormann’s subgraphs, but all binary relations holding among them as well. We prove
that 〈P⊑(G),⊑L〉 satisfies (a1)-(a7), so by ruling out some graphs, supplementation and
extensionality are recovered. For reasons of space we provide only the proof of strong
supplementation that implies weak supplementation and extensionality, see (t1) and (t2).
t5 〈P⊑(G),⊑L〉 satisfies (a6) (strong supplementation).
Proof. First we prove that if X,Y ∈ P⊑(G) then VX ⊆ VY implies X ⊑L Y . X,Y ∈
P⊑(G) implies that EX = EG/VX = {(u,v) ∈ EG | u,v ∈ VX} and EY = EG/VY =
{(u,v) ∈ EG | u,v ∈VY }. Then EY/VX = {(u,v) ∈ EG | u,v ∈VX∩VY }. If VX ⊆VY , then
EY/VX = {(u,v) ∈ EG | u,v ∈ VX}= EX . Similarly for the restrictions of the labelling
functions. Thus EX = EY/VX , λX = λY/VX , and VX ⊆ VY , i.e., X ⊑L Y . Now, from
X,Y ∈ P⊑(G) but Y "L X we have VY * VX , so there exists v ∈ VY\VX such that
λ(v) = a. Z = 〈{v:a},EY/{v}〉 is such that Z ⊑L Y and it belongs to P⊑(G) (⊑L is
transitive). But because VZ ∩VX = ∅, X and Z cannot have a common subgraph. !
Before moving to expounding our proposal, we want to highlight an important dif-
ference between the approaches of Bennett and Mormann (and Armstrong). Mormann’s
approach is combinatorial: starting from a graph, all its parts are generated. For instance,
starting from G = a! a! b! b, P⊆(G) (and P⊑(G)) necessarily contains all the ‘in-
termediate wholes’ a! a, a! b, and b! b that are ⊆L- (and ⊑L-) included in G. On
the other hand, Bennett’s approach allows to explicitly select what are the relevant parts
for a given complex entity (universal), i.e., there is a non-systematic filtering process that
depends on the specific entity considered. For instance, the three graphs in Fig. 4 repre-
sent different ways of viewing a string universal aabb. All these three alternatives satisfy
the order constraints ! specified in G but they differ in mereological terms. In G1 the
string is directly composed by two letters of kind a and two letters of kind b, in G2 the
string is composed by two shorter strings each one composed by two letters of the same
kind, and in G3 the string is composed by one letter and one shorter string composed by
three letters of two kinds. It easy to check that G1-G3 are not isomorphic, it is enough to
count the number of edges (representing the slots). In Mormann’s approach this differ-
ence cannot be represented because, once the notion of subgraph is fixed, a graph rep-
resenting a complex state has a unique mereological structure. This is also linked to the
refusal of structured particulars and structural universals, i.e., in Mormann’s approach all
the particulars and universals are atomic, there are only relational (bonding) patterns of
thick particulars (of given kinds). Vice versa, the idea of having different (mereological)
levels of entities with ‘intermediate structured components’ is important to represent, for
instance, the intended assembly of mechanical artefacts. In this view, in G1 the artefact
is obtained directly assembling four constructional (atomic) parts while in G2 it has two
different components both composed of two constructional parts. To deal with these sit-
uations, we propose a framework that integrates Mormann’s and Bennett’s approaches.
6. Proposal
We are now in the position to propose a graph account able to represent not only complex
states of affairs but also structured particulars and structural universals.
We follow Mormann in grounding the representation on particulars and states, to
avoid the limitations in expressivity of Bennett’s approach. But we depart from Mor-
mann’s proposal by explicitly representing both structured particulars and structural uni-
versals7 and by distinguishing parthood among states from parthood among thin partic-
ulars called here individuals8 (parthood among universals being derived from parthood
among individuals). In our graphs, a vertex represents a structured or unstructured in-
dividual while its label denotes the structural or non structural universal that, in Arm-
strong’s terms, is its nature.9 We add proper parthood relationships between individuals
as edges in the graph, in addition to edges in Mormann’s graphs representing binary (e.g.,
bonding or preceding) relationships. The parthood relation between states (represented
by graphs) is modeled through the induced subgraph relation ⊑L. As seen above with
(t5), ⊑L filters out some of Mormann’s substates and yields an extensional mereology.
Introducing explicitly in the graph structured individuals with their structural uni-
versals and their parthood relationships is what we adopt from Bennett’s account. We
welcome the possibility to represent only relevant structural universals and individuals,
without imposing an extensional mereology, as seen above discussing Fig. 4. In addition,
a novel possibility arises in our combined approach: binary relations may hold on any
individual, atomic or structured. This allows for, for instance, the representation of rela-
tionships between words without necessarily reducing them to the relationships between
their composing letters. More importantly, it allows relationships on structured individu-
als that cannot be reduced to relationships between atomic individuals. For instance, the
relationship of Lea loving her cat can hardly be reduced to some relations between cer-
tain subparts of Lea’s body with certain subparts of her cat. We then have the possibility
to represent emerging relationships that are typical of a given ontological or granularity
level. In this case, the person level significantly differs from the body part level.
Formally, we consider a graph structure 〈P⊑(G),⊑L〉, where G = 〈V,E
p,Er,L, τ,η,λ〉
is a labelled multidigraph such that:
– V is a non-empty set of vertices representing individuals, atomic or structured;
– Ep is a set of edges representing proper parthood relationships among individuals;
– Er is a set of edges representing other binary relationships among individuals;
7When Mormann claims that the thin particulars involved in the thick particulars in the graph M1 in Fig. 3
‘instantiate’ being methane he just suggests that methane molecules are composed by thin particulars, but
neither these molecules nor the universal being methane exist in his account.
8Individuals are assumed as disjoint from states, i.e., ontologically, they differ from states even though both
individual and states are particulars.
9This means that we cannot represent the structure of many properties, for instance distributional properties
like being polka-dotted. This would require to significantly extend or alter the approach.
– L is a set of labels for vertices, representing nature-universals of individuals;10
– τ and η are total functions Er ∪Ep → V for edges’ tail and head;
– λ is a total labelling function V → L.
and G satisfies the following two structural constraints:
(i) 〈V,Ep, τ/Ep,η/Ep〉 is acyclic (and thus without loops);11
(ii) any two G1,G2 ∈ P⊑(G) such that v1 ∈ VG1 , v2 ∈ VG2 and:
– λ(v1) = λ(v2);
i.e., v1 and v2 represent individuals with the same nature;
– there are v′
1
,v′
2
∈ VG, e1,e2 ∈ E
p
G
s.t. τ(e1) = v
′
1
, τ(e2) = v
′
2
, η(e1) = v1, η(e2) = v2
i.e., v1 and v2 represent structured individuals;
– for any v′
1
∈ VG1 , either v
′
1
= v1 or there is e1 ∈ E
p
G1
s.t. τ(e1) = v
′
1
and η(e1) = v1
and similarly for G2;
i.e., all vertices in G1 (G2) are direct parts of v1 (v2);
– for any e ∈ E
p
G
if η(e) = v1 then τ(e) ∈ VG1 and if η(e) = v2 then τ(e) ∈ VG2
i.e., all direct parts of v1 and v2 in G are also in G1 and G2;
are L-isomorphic (d6).
Constraint (ii) forces all instances of a structural universal to have the same internal
structure, that is, to be isomorphic in terms of parts and relations between these parts.
Given such a graph G as a model of a whole state of affairs, the structure 〈P⊑(G),⊑L〉
is taken as a model of all its substates and parthood relations among states, forming
an extensional mereology as shown in the previous section. Notice that states may now
explicitly contain parthood relationships between individuals (edges from Ep).
Induced ⊑L-subgraphs of G will keep constraint (i) imposed on G but not constraint
(ii). The verification of (i) is trivial. For (ii) consider G : u:a ← x:b,v:a ← y:b and G′ :
u:a ← x:b,v:a, then G′ ⊑L G but u:a ← x:b and v:a are not L-isomorphic. An interesting
extension might thus be obtained by restricting ⊑L even more so as to keep as subgraphs
of G only those G′ such that for all individuals of a given kind (with the same label) in
G′ that are structured individuals in G, either none or all of their direct parts in G are also
in G′. This would force G′ to satisfy the structural homogeneity constraint on universals
(ii) too. It would at the same time avoid considering as substates those that keep only
a partial picture of the (direct) part structure of the structured individuals. This would
further strengthen the idea that focusing on a (set of) individual(s), one embraces all what
holds internally to them, not only their properties and, in our approach, their internal
relations, but also all their parts up to a given granularity level. We leave this extension
and the investigation of the mereology obtained among states for further work.
Turning to structural universals, on each graph G, one can read off (and could extract
from it) a purely universal graph where vertices represent now universals—they corre-
spond to the labels of G—i.e., all instances of a same universal are grouped into a single
10Here we do not use labels for edges, which could represent various relational universals when labelling
edges in Er or even ways of being part when labelling edges in Ep. This is left as a an extension. Note that G
is a multigraph, i.e., it is possible to have several edges with the same tail-head pair of vertices, e.g., in the case
different kinds of relationships hold between the same individuals.
11Parthood transitivity is supposed to be accounted for through paths in the interpretation function, similarly
to the interpretation of Bennett’s parthood in terms of graphs seen in Sect. 4 so there is no need here for any
other constraint on τ and η on Ep. Here loops are not necessary because we are considering proper parthood.
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Figure 5. Our account of 3 states of affairs from Fig.1 and Fig. 3 and their corresponding structural universals.
node of the generated graph. Multiple occurrences of edges between two nodes are kept,
except when grouping parthood edge heads (structural universal wholes), to retain only
one occurrence of their part structure. In this way we obtain a structural universal graph
similar to the graphs G6 and G7 in Fig. 1 or G1, G2 and G3 in Fig. 4. Since constraint
(ii) on our graphs obliges all instances of a structural universal to have the same internal
structure, a unique structure is read off for each structural universal. This is adequate for
universals such as molecules, strings, words or sentences, whose structure is fixed, but
less for other universals like biological species and artefact kinds, whose instances are
not all isomorphic as there are optional parts (e.g., hair for humans) and parts that can
have variable properties (e.g. black or brown hair). Wittgenstein’s example of being a
game shows that instances of universals (concepts) might not even share any property. Of
course this criticism applies to Mormann’s and Bennett’s proposals as well, and in fact
to any classical logic approach defining a type of individuals in terms of their essential
mereological structure. To handle structural universals whose instances are not all iso-
morphic, various refinements may be considered. For instance, one could allow for dis-
junctive labels, exploit some graph distance measure, or consider that a shared internal
structure characterized in terms of isomorphism of (maximal) subgraphs could represent
the structural universal. But we leave these possible extensions for further work.
Running example. Fig. 5 depicts our standard aba and baa string examples and the
methane example as states of affairs involving individuals in our graph representation
system.12 As previously, parthood edges of Ep are drawn with solid arrows and binary re-
lation edges of Er with dotted arrows. U1, U2, and U3 are the structural universal graphs
read off or extracted from G1, G2, and G3 (U1 and U2 are G7 and G6 in Fig. 1). Note
that if we consider G1 and G2 to represent substates of a larger state, then the universal
that can be read off is much more confusing, as shown by U1+2. This is because the rela-
tional universals (preceding links between letters in the strings) loose the context of the
structural universal in which they appear. As was seen in Sect. 4 discussing the graphs
12Even though being bonded is usually considered as a symmetric relation, here we assume a stronger
oriented version (because our graphs are directed).
s : [a cat eats a rat]S
p1 : [a cat]NP p2 : [eats a rat]VP
w1 : [a]D w2 : [cat]N w23: [eats]V p33: [a rat]NP
w4 : [a]D w25: [rat]Nm1 : [eat]STE m2 : [s]INF
 l1 : [a]L l2 : [c]L  l3 : [a]L  l4 : [t]L  l5 : [e]L  l6: [a]L  l7: [t]L l8 : [s]L  l9: [a]L  l10 : [r]L  l11 : [a]L  l12 : [t]L
[a cat eats a rat]S
[a cat]NP [eats a rat]VP
 [cat]N
 [eats]V [a rat]NP
[a]D [rat]N [eat]STE [s]INF
[c]L [a]L
[t]L [e]L  [s]L[r]L
Figure 6. The structure of an occurrence s of the sentence a cat eats a ratS and the corresponding universal.
on Fig. 2, it is in general not possible to recover the internal structure of an instance of
a structural universal from such graphs describing structural universals, even when their
mereological structure is extended with binary relations. There is an irremediable infor-
mation loss during the extraction process from states. This is why our approach to struc-
tural universals is founded on the representation of states of affairs involving individuals.
More complex example. Linguistic structural universals, such as texts, phrases, words,
morphemes and letters (or phonemes), illustrate the usefulness of the multiple levels of
decomposition. The sentence [a cat eats a rat]S , an abstract entity that can have many
occurrences and thus can be considered as a case of structural universal, is composed
of two phrases, the noun phrase [a cat]NP and the verb phrase [eats a rat]VP, in turn
composed of a verb and another noun phrase. This abstract sentence is also composed of
four words, [a]D, [cat]N , [eats]V , [rat]N , one of which, the determiner [a]D, twice over.
The verb [eats]V is composed of two morphemes, the stem [eat]S T E and the inflexion
[s]INF . Finally, the sentence is composed of six letters, [a]L, [c]L, [e]L, [r]L, [s]L, and
[t]L, [a]L being part 4 times over and [t]L 3 times over. Note that the letter [a]L and
the determiner [a]D are different universals, and that one could also distinguish simple
words such as [cat]N from the unique morpheme that make them up (for the sake of
conciseness, we do not pursue this here). Preceding relationships hold among letters
as well as among morphemes, words and phrases. The top graph on Fig. 6 shows the
state of affairs describing the structure of an occurrence s and its parts, from which the
structure of the universals they instantiate can be read off as the bottom graph. Note that
the fact that the mereology defined on individuals does not satisfy weak supplementation
allows to represent a sort of constitution relation, e.g., the relation between a statue and
its material substratum. This is the case, for instance, of the parthood relation between
the [a]L letter l1 and the [a]D determiner w1 on the left of the top graph on Fig. 6.
7. Conclusion
We have critically reviewed three state-of-the-art approaches to structural universals and
complex states, including one that actually claims that structural universals are a mere
façon de parler and cannot be accounted for explicitly. This analysis has been done in a
graph-theoretical framework shedding light on formalisms at first sight very different. It
leads us to propose a new account, more expressive than the three approaches considered.
Our representational system gives an explicit account of a universal being part of a
structural universal several times over, while distinguishing structural universals sharing
the same parts on the basis of the internal structure of their instances. In addition, ex-
plicitly representing structured individuals, labeling them with structural universals and
using parthood relations among individuals allow for distinguishing mereology among
states from mereology among individuals and maintaining mereological extensionality
on states while leaving open the nature of mereology among individuals and universals.
By not assuming that any substate corresponds to a (possibly spurious) structural uni-
versal, the system can accommodate several levels of universal decomposition. Finally,
relational universals can hold among atomic and structured individuals alike.
We have seen on examples that our system allows for a detailed account of strings,
molecules and linguistic entities. We conjecture that it is also adequate to represent other
structural universals important in applied ontology. For an actual implementation, one
could at first envisage to translate our graphs in formulas of (a fragment of) FOL, as
done in [8] on molecule examples, using graphs as compact specifications. This would
represent the individuals and their properties involved in the state of affairs denoted by
the formula. But it would leave the very notion of structural universal and the mereo-
logical structure of these universals not explicitly accounted for; moreover, such a trans-
lation could not avoid spurious subformulas corresponding to spurious states of affairs
and to spurious structural universals. Enriching the representation with the reification of
structural universals and complex states of affairs could be part of a solution. We instead
anticipate more powerful applications within a mixed logic-and-graph framework tak-
ing advantage of graph-based reasoning. To fully exploit such reasoning mechanisms,
future work will aim at extending our approach to handle universals not limited to the
whole nature of their instances (a limitation inherited from Armstrong and Mormann)
and subsumption relationships between them.
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